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THE PROTECTION OF PIONEER
INNOVATIONS – LESSONS LEARNT
FROM THE SEMICONDUCTOR CHIP
INDUSTRY AND ITS IP LAW
FRAMEWORK
THOMAS HOEREN*
1. INTRODUCTION
In the second half of the 20th century, semiconductor technology as
integrated circuits (IC), commonly known as microchips, became more
and more dominating in our lives. Microchips are the control center of
simple things like toasters as well as of complex high-tech machines for
medical use. Of course, they also define the hearts of each computer.
With the invention of semiconductor technology, a whole new economic
sector began its rise and soon played a major role in the economies of
the large industrial countries like the U.S., Japan and the EC.1 Especially, it stands out for its innovational power and its readiness to invest. Microchips are a symbol for the modern industrial society.
In the following considerations, I will try to show how and why
*
Prof. Dr. Thomas Hoeren is the head of the Institute for Information, Telecommunications and Media Law (ITM) at the University of Münster (Germany). Thanks to
the Stanford Law School for allowing me to use the excellent library resources during my
stay as a visiting professor at Stanford in 2014. Special thanks to Richard S. Stern and
Steven F. Benz (Kellogg, Huber, Hansen, Todd, Evans & Figel, P. L. L. C.), to Arno
Körber (former head of the patent division of Siemens/Munich) and to Mrs. Yuichi Utsumi
(IEEJ/Toyko) for their comments. Further thanks to Dr. Roger J. Burt (European and
Chartered Patent Attorney and formerly Head of Intellectual Property Law, IBM EMEA)
for co-reading my study and giving me his extremely valuable advices as to the future of
semiconductor industry. A first draft of this study has been presented at a WIPO Workshop in Geneva – February 5 and 6, 2015.
1. Jeffrey T. Macher, David C. Mowery & Alberto Di Minin, Semiconductors, in
INNOVATION IN GLOBAL INDUSTRIES: U.S. FIRMS COMPETING IN A NEW WORLD (COLLECTED
STUDIES)
(Jeffrey
T.
Macher
&
David
C.
Mowery
eds.,
2008),
http://www.nap.edu/openbook.php?record_id=12112&page=101
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semiconductors became a major technical innovation (Part 1). Then, I
will discuss some of the important features of the global “ecosystem” of
the chip industry (Part 2). All these observations will lead to the main
chapter discussing the existing sui generis protection for the layout of
semiconductors (Part 3) and the economic and legal reasons for its collapse (Part 4), along with the continuing high value of the “classical” IP
rights such as patents and copyright.

PART 1: SEMICONDUCTORS AS TECHNICAL INNOVATION AND
ITS ECONOMIC CONTRIBUTION
TECHNICAL INNOVATION
In order to illustrate the IP legal system, a first short look at the
technical devices is necessary.2 The construction of microchips is traditionally based on silicon dies (wafers) on which the developer “prints”
integrated circuits via specially created patterns (masks) in a photolithography process. The circuits control the transmission of electrical
impulses, including those that control computers. The threedimensional disposition of the pattern, which defines the structure of
the circuit, is called layout design or topography. 3 Semiconductors can
be found almost everywhere, i.e., PCs, laptops, servers, mobile phones
or consumer electronics (TV sets, gaming consoles, and household appliances). They are also an integral part of automobiles, rail services, or
military devices.
1901–1954: The Pre-Planar Period
The first period could be characterized as the period of individual
researchers and entrepreneurs with strong egos. The first U.S patent on
semiconductors was granted to the radio pioneer Jagadis Bose for his
semiconductor rectifiers (1901). After that the research topic of the semiconductor remained an issue for single researchers around the globe
who protected their semiconductor inventions by patents. In 1906 the
American physicist Lee De Forest invented the vacuum tube triode, enabling the amplification and switching of electrical signals. Furthermore, Julius Lilienfeld4 received patents for his basic idea of the solid
2. Thomas Hoeren, Das deutsche Halbleiterschutzgesetz vom 1.11.1987, BETRIEBSBERATER 1904 (1988).
3. See STANLEY WOLF & RICHARD N. TAUBER, SILICON PROCESSING FOR THE VLSI
ERA: PROCESS TECHNOLOGY (2000).
4. William F. Brinkmann, Douglas E. Haggan & William W. Troutman, A History
of the Invention of the Transistor and Where It Will Lead Us, 32 IEEE JOURNAL OF
SOLID-STATE
CIRCUITS,
No.
12
(1997),
https://classes.soe.ucsc.edu/ee171/Winter06/notes/transistor.pdf [March 17, 2015].
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state transistor (MOS field-effect transistor) in 19255 and 1930.6 In
1933, the German Pohl published his technical vision that semiconductors in radio receivers might one day replace vacuum tubes, which were,
in those days, too big and unreliable. In the late 1940s, large computers
were built with over 10,000 vacuum tubes and occupied over 93 square
meters of space.
The big boom of semiconductors started during World War II when
the U.S military forces needed special radar receivers to detect and convert microwave signals.7 After the war, Bell Telephone Labs in Holmdel,
N.J., a subsidiary of AT&T, became the leading force for future developments.8 In December 1947, three Bell employees, and later Nobel
Prize winners, John Bardeen, William Shockley, and Walter Brattain
published their invention of the first successful semiconductor amplifier. The transistor quickly replaced the vacuum tube due to its small
size, low heat generation and high reliability.
1954: The IC Period
Around 1954, computers became increasingly equipped with microchips. In addition, the U.S military forces and space agencies expressed
their great interest in the new technologies and forced the researchers
to focus on the miniaturization of microchips. 9 Simultaneously, Bell engineers implemented their idea of photolithographic techniques developed for producing patterns on printed circuit boards. Precise window
sections were etched chemically where unexposed resist had been
washed away leaving the exposed hardened resist; in 1957, such an
etching technology was granted a patent protection. 10 In September
1955, William Shockley and Arnold Beckman founded the Shockley
5. US Patent No. 1745175: Julius Edgar Lilienfeld, Method and Apparatus for
Controlling Electric Current (first filed in Canada on October 22, 1925).
6.
7.

US Patent No. 1745175 (issued Jan. 28, 1930).
C. A. Warren, B. McMillan & B. D. Holbrook, Military Systems Engineering and
Research, in A HISTORY OF ENGINEERING AND SCIENCE IN THE BELL SYSTEM: NATIONAL
SERVICE IN WAR AND PEACE, 617-48 (1925-1975) (M. D. Fagan ed., 1978); Thomas J. Misa,
Military Needs, Commercial Realities, and the Development of the Transistor, 1948-1958,
in MILITARY ENTERPRISE AND TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE: PERSPECTIVES ON THE AMERICAN
EXPERIENCE 256-64 (Merrit Roe Smith ed., 1985).
8. For the role of Bell Labs see JEREMY BERNSTEIN, THREE DEGREES ABOVE ZERO:
BELL LABS IN THE INFORMATION AGE (1984); J. Hornbeck, The Transistor, in A HISTORY
OF ENGINEERING AND SCIENCE IN THE BELL SYSTEM: ELECTRONICS TECHNOLOGY (19251975) 12 (F. M. Smits ed., 1985).
9. A special focus point was the US Army´s Signal Engineering Laboratory at Fort
Monmouth, New Jersey. See KENNETH FLAMM, MISMANAGED TRADE? STRATEGIC POLICY
AND THE SEMICONDUCTOR INDUSTRY 30-31 (1996)[hereinafter MISMANAGED TRADE?].
10. US Patent No. 2890395: Jay W. Lathrop & James R. Nall (both US Army’s Diamond Ordnance Fuze Laboratories in Maryland), Semiconductor Construction (June 9,
1959).
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Semiconductor Laboratory as a Division of Beckman Instruments in
Mountain View which is regarded as the birthplace of Silicon Valley.
Shockley could use the extra cleanliness of California (which was important for producing semiconductors) and the amazing labor forces of
the Californian universities for his company. 11
Only two years later, eight of his employees, the so-called traitorous
eight, left the company and founded Fairchild Semiconductor, one of the
most influential companies in the semiconductor industry.12 For instance, Jean Hoerni, from Fairchild, created the idea for a planar transistor.13 Multiple transistors, resistors, and capacitors were fabricated
on a silicon wafer, connecting them by a conducting pattern of aluminum via a silicon dioxide film, which formed over the active silicon layer
and created a circuit on a silicon die in the impurity diffusion process.14
In July 1959, Robert Noyce,15 from Fairchild, filed a patent application
for "Semiconductor Device and Lead Structure,"16 a first model of an integrated circuit. The invention of Noyce was recorded only a few months
after the key findings of Jack Kilby, an employee of Texas Instruments.17 Kilby invented the concept of the monolithic integrated circuit
by linking diodes, transistors, resistors, and capacitors with aluminum
metal lines on top of the protective oxide coating.18 This involved creating electronic circuits on a semiconductor substrate by forming multiple
circuit elements, such as resistors and transistors, and it became the
basic patent for ICs. This, together with the Noyce patent, became the
basic patent coverage for ICs19 and the beginning of real business in Silicon Valley. The inventions of Noyce and Kilby were made independently of each other so that Fairchild and Texas Instruments had separate

11. PETER ROBIN MORRIS, A HISTORY OF THE WORLD SEMICONDUCTOR INDUSTRY 89
(1990).
12. See Motorola, Inc. v. Fairchild Camera and Instrument Corp., 366 F. Supp. 1173
(D. Ariz. 1973).
13. Id.
14. See Semiconductor History Museum of Japan, Trends in the Semiconductor Industry (2011), http://www.shmj.or.jp/english/trends.html.
15. LESLIE BERLIN, THE MAN BEHIND THE MICROCHIP: ROBERT NOYCE AND THE
INVENTION OF SILICON VALLEY (2005).
16. US Patent No. 2981877 (filed Jul. 30, 1959).
17. He received the Nobel Prize in 2000 for that invention. See CHRISTOPHE
LÉCUYER, MAKING SILICON VALLEY: INNOVATION AND THE GROWTH OF HIGH TECH, 19301970 (2006).
18. Id.
19. However, the history of who invented the IC is much more controversial. See
generally BO LOJEK, HISTORY OF SEMICONDUCTOR ENGINEERING (2007); see generally
ARJUN N. SAXENA, INVENTION OF INTEGRATED CIRCUITS: UNTOLD IMPORTANT FACTS
(2009).
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patent rights in their invention.20 That was one of the main reasons why
the IC industry flourished from the beginning; it allowed young startups the use of existing semiconductor techniques for their own purposes.
Former employees of Fairchild and his competitor, Texas Instruments, founded a lot of small enterprises, like National Semiconductor
Corp, Advanced Micro Devices Ltd. and, last but not least, Intel Corp.
In 1977, the Federal Trade Commission noted:
The fact that companies can rapidly copy each other is very important.
This rapid copying is the result of the mobility of personnel from firm
to firm and the unwillingness of most firms to bring trade secrets or
patent infringement suits. The rapid innovation and coping can also
be explained by the number of times executive and technical personnel have left large firms to set up their own small, spin-off firms.21

Most of the spin-offs were situated within a few square miles within the Santa Clara Valley in California.

And the Rest of the World?
Reading the existing literature on the history of semiconductors, it
seems that the US was really the lone inventor for some time in this
field and that other countries only entered the stage as copycats later.
The chip innovation landscape was, however, more complex than the
mostly US-originated research literature seems to lead on. Much of the
research literature on this matter is very U.S. centered.
It is often forgotten that European and Japanese inventors paved
the way of semiconductors as well. It seems like Europe was active
from the outset in transistors, for instance; some European scientists
were led by the idea of solid-state amplifiers.22 In 1934, the German expert, Oskar Heil, constructed a working field transistor (Feldeffekttransistor) and received a patent for its construction.23 When the excessive
20. That led to a long judicial litigation, decided by the United States Court of Customs and Patent Appeals. The Court decided in favor of Noyce on the basis of too broad
wording of the Kilby patent. Noyce v. Kilby, 416 F.2d 1391, 1397-1398 (C.C.P.A. 1969).
21. FED. TRADE COMM., BUREAU OF ECONOMICS, ECONOMIC REPORT ON THE
SEMICONDUCTOR INDUSTRY: STAFF REPORT TO THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION (1977).
22. See Michael Riordan, How Europe Missed The Transistor, 42 IEEE SPECTRUM,
(Nov. 1, 2005), available at http://spectrum.ieee.org/semiconductors/devices/how-europemissed-the-transistor.
23. GB 439457: Oskar Heil, Improvements in or Relating to Electrical Amplifiers
and other Control Arrangements and Devices (first filed in Germany, March 1934); see R.
G. Arns, The Other Transistor: Early History of the Metal-Oxide-Semiconductor FieldEffect Transistor, 7 ENGINEERING SCIENCE AND EDUCATION JOURNAL, No. 5, 233, 236,
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thoroughness of the German patent office delayed the examination, he
translated the application into English and filed for a patent in Britain.24 The patent was issued within nine months. 25 In 1952, the British
physicist, G. W. A. Dummer, had the idea of integrating the transistors
in solid blocks without any connecting wires. The functional elements
should be connected directly by “cutting out areas of the various layers.”26 This vision was implemented by the UK company, Plessey, and
not by Dummer. Based on Dummer’s ideas, they produced the world´s
first integrated circuit model, which was demonstrated at the 1957 International Symposium on Components in Malvern, England. 27 However, the project was never realized as the funding was inadequate and
potential customers remained skeptical.
In August 1948, German physicists Herbert F. Mataré (1912–
2011)28 and Heinrich Welker (1912–1981),29 employees of Compagnie
des Freins et Signaux Westinghouse in Aulnay-sous-Bois (France),
started an application procedure for a patent on a “transistron,” which
was produced on behalf of the French telephone company and the
French military. More and more European governments became convinced that European R & D in this area should be supported by a European industrial policy. The national states used very high tariffs, subsidies, and other defensive strategies to build up "national champions”
in the European semiconductor industry. Still, the majority of these
companies were incapable of competing with US players, and were
forced to leave the market to American and (later) Asian companies.
China and Korea30 entered the stage very late, mainly as mere chip
Oct.1998.
24. Armand Van Dormael, The “French Transistor,” 23, available at
http://www.cdvandt.org/VanDormael.pdf.
25. Id.
26. W. A. G. Dummer, Electronic Components in Great Britain, SYMPOSIUM ON
PROGRESS IN QUALITY ELECTRONIC COMPONENTS, IRE (1952); Mike Green, Dummer's Vision of Solid Circuits at the UK Royal Radar Establishment, 35 IEEE ANNALS OF THE
HISTORY OF COMPUTING, No. 1, 55-56, Jan.-Mar. 2013.
27. David Manners, 50 Years of the UK Semiconductor Industry, ELECTRONICS
WEEKLY (Sep. 17, 2010), http://www.electronicsweekly.com/news/business/50-years-of-theuk-semiconductor-industry-2010-09/.
28. John Markoff, Herbert F. Mataré. An inventor of the transistor has his moment,
N. Y. TIMES, Feb. 24, 2003; Armand Van Dormael, Biographies: Herbert F. Mataré, 31
IEEE ANNALS OF THE HISTORY OF COMPUTING, No. 3, 68-73 (2009).
29. Kai Christian Handel, Anfänge der Halbleiterforschung und -entwicklung:
dargestellt an den Biographien von vier deutschen Halbleiterpionieren, PhD Thesis
RWTH Aachen (1999)(on file with author); Armand van Dormael called Mataré and
Welker the real owner of the Nobel Prize for transistors; see ARMAND VAN DORMAEL, THE
SILICON REVOLUTION 157 (2012); “French Transistor,” supra note 25.
30. See S. Ran Kim, The Korean System of Innovation and the Semiconductor Industry: A Governance Perspective (forthcoming), http://www.oecd.org/korea/2098646.pdf;
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producers. However, the situation was quite different in Japan. 31

Early Years: Japan as Chip Producer
Japan started its semiconductor business by producing transistors
on the basis of a cheap cost structure. From the beginning, US companies cooperated with Japanese companies particularly concerning the
inexpensive production of microchips for consumer electronics. Hitachi,
Matsuhita Electric, Toshiba, Nippon Electric, Mitsubishi Electric, and
Kobe Kogyo (today part of Fujitsu) were the first and major companies
to produce semiconductors.32 They produced their chips on the basis of
the Bell licensing model (see below) and sent thousands of Japanese researchers to the U.S. to visit conferences and semiconductor plants. 33
By 1957, they were all active in producing chips for the internal
Japanese market and the international market. Most of them entered
the industry in the second half of the 1950s. They started their own
R&D programs in the early fifties. 34 The budgets were, however, rather
low in the beginning; the companies relied mostly on technical assistance agreements with foreign companies. In the middle of the sixties,
R&D expenses only amounted to 2% of the semiconductor sales in Japan, compared to 6% in the U.S.35 Few patents were awarded for the
technology in Japan before 1962, and none before 1959. Japan could
have used the high level of financial support of its banks and big enterprises.36
Japan also avoided the high labor mobility of employees and recruited experts for a lifetime.37 Start-up companies in Japan, such as
Tokyo Tsushin Kogyo, later renamed Sony, integrated the new technolMORRIS, supra note 12; Rundong Ke, Senior Project, Comparison of China and Japan’s
Economic
Development
in
the
Semiconductor
Industry
(2012),
http://digitalcommons.bard.edu/senproj_s2012/342.
31. For the different perspectives of US and Japanese scholars in this matter, See
M. Uenohara, T. Sugano, J. G. Linvill & F. B. Weinstein, Background, in COMPETITIVE
EDGE: THE SEMICONDUCTOR INDUSTRY IN THE U.S. AND JAPAN 14-15 (D. I. Okimoto, T.
Sugano & F. B. Weinstein eds., 1984).
32. See JAPAN ELECTRONIC BUYERS GUIDE 1 (1965).
33. See MISMANAGED TRADE?, supra note 10 at 40-45; with references to a NHK
documentary series.
34. C. C. Gee, World Trends in Semiconductor Development and Production,
BRITISH COMMUNICATIONS AND ELECTRONICS 450-61, June (1959).
35. OECD, General Report – Gaps in Technology, tbl.B2 (1968),
http://static2.orf.at/vietnam2/files/futurezone/200916/generalreportgapstechnology_65222.
pdf.
36. For the surprising effect of banking, see ELEANOR M. HADLEY, ANTITRUST IN
JAPAN, ch.11 (1970).
37. MORRIS, supra note 12 at 98; I. M. Mackintosh, Dominant Trends Affecting the
Future Structure of the Semiconductor Industry, 43 RADIO AND ELECTRICAL ENGINEER 50
(1973).
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ogy within small size radios, such as the famous Sony TR55 portable.
Another Japanese company, NEC, used semiconductors for the new
market of desktop calculators. In the early 1950s, Japanese companies
started to produce semiconductor devices under license.38 In July 1956,
five Japanese firms licensed American patents to produce special radio
receivers.39 In 1959, Japan had become the largest producer of transistors so that 50% of the American market for portable radios were made
in Japan. This led to the first demands in the US press for import controls.40 The Japanese Government heavily supported the growth of the
semiconductor industry especially by promoting the 1971 MITI program, which helped Japan become one of the most important semiconductor countries in the world. The semiconductors were used at this
time for military purposes and later for computers in the US, while Japan was more fascinated by its potential use in portable low-cost consumer devices, such as radios, TVs, and calculators.41
Even when the costs for designing chips increased, American and
Japanese corporations worked hand in hand based on cross-licensing
agreements. But the competition between the two countries increased.
The small start-up companies in the U.S. were constructed as being “fablessness” (i.e., the organizational separation of the design and fabrication stages)42 contrary to the traditional, so-called IDMs (integrated device manufacturers). Countries like Japan and Korea started by simply
acting as cheap producers of chips with low labor costs. 43 The Japanese
competitors invented the vertically integrated business model where
semiconductor companies not only developed, but produced and distributed chips and application products as well (Sony).
Japan as Chip Inventor
From the beginning of transistor and semiconductor developments,
Japanese experts were involved.44 The Nobel Prize winner, Leo Esaki,
of Sony, noticed negative resistance characteristics in the current38. MORRIS, supra note 12 at 99.
39. The companies were Hitachi, Tokyo Tsushin Kogyo Ltd., Mitsubishi Electric
Mfg., Tokyo Shibaura Electric and Kote Kogyo.
40. See e.g. ELECTRONICS ISSUE, January 6, 1961.
41. It is not true that semiconductors were an “American development,” as Intel
stated in the Copyright hearings.
42. Franco Malerba, Richard Nelson, Luigi Orsenigo & Sidney G. Winter, Vertical

Integration and Disintegration of Computer Firms: A History Friendly Model of the CoEvolution of the Computer and Semiconductor Industries (Econstor Working Paper No.
0619, 2006), http://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/31831/1/522546056.pdf.
43. S. Ran Kim, supra note 31.
44. See J. Nishizawa & A. Ouchi, Nihon no handotai kaihatsu (Semiconductor Development in Japan), TOKYO: THE INDUSTRIAL RESEARCH ASSOCIATION (1993).
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voltage characteristics of very highly doped pn-junction in 1957 and
talked about these phenomena at several international conferences. His
publications were used by Shockley, the former US-inventor of the transistor. Unfortunately for Esaki, there was no clear R&D strategy developed by the Japanese government at that time (which might have to do
with the peculiarity that Japan had no military forces or space program
interested in these technologies as in the U.S.). Therefore, Esaki never
asked for a patent for his invention but shared his ideas with other international researchers. In 1960, a Bell employee filed a patent application for a device utilizing the Esaki effect.45
The development of semiconductor technology was organized by
two players, the Electrical Communications Laboratory (ECL) owned by
NTT and the Electrotechnical Laboratory (ETL) funded by MITI. NTT
was a public corporation at that time, the Nippon Telegraph and Telephone Corporation. MITI was the very powerful Ministry of International Trade and Industry. Apparently, the ETL made first transistor
experiments in 1951 while ECL constructed the first properly functioning device.46
Later in 1960, NEC began the development of the first ICs; NEC
established p-Channel MOS (Metal-Oxide Semiconductor) technologies
in 1964.47 With the increased production of Japanese MOS calculators,
the U.S. semiconductor industry lost interest in supporting their Japanese colleagues.48 They feared that they were losing their domestic customers. Furthermore, it proved more and more difficult to sell in Japan
in the face of the growing “Buy Japan” attitude. Indeed, in the early
1970s, it was not allowed to import complex ICs into Japan (apart from
previously specified end customers). The Japanese Government was
very aware of the national deficiencies in basic research and product
design but were determined to overcome these deficiencies. Japanese
experts asserted that the technology transfer between the U.S. and Japan was very one-sided. The consequence was a growing reluctance on
the part of some U.S. manufacturers to share their technology with the
Japanese via licensing contracts. The Japanese increasingly recognized

45. US Patent No. 3058064 (filed Feb. 1, 1960).
46. See YASUZO NAKAGAWA, SEMICONDUCTOR DEVELOPMENT IN JAPAN 22-31 (1985);
Makoto Watanabe, Electrical Communications Laboratories: Recent LSI Activities, JAPAN
TELECOMMUNICATIONS REVIEW 3-8, January 1979.
47. See D. I. OKIMOTO, T. SUGANO & F. B. WEINSTEIN, COMPETITIVE EDGE: THE
SEMICONDUCTOR INDUSTRY IN THE U.S. AND JAPAN 16 (1984); T. Kurosawa, Shirikon Kotohajime (The Origin of Silicon Business), TOKYO: NEC CREATIVE 73-75 (1997).
48. Rundong Ke, Senior Project, Comparison of China and Japan’s Economic Development
in
the
Semiconductor
Industry
(2012),
http://digitalcommons.bard.edu/senproj_s2012/342.
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that fruitful access to U.S. research would depend on them offering
enough to the U.S. side to make a fair exchange.49
So a research wave started in Japan in the late 1960s. 50Japanese
semiconductor producers such as NEC, Toshiba, and Hitachi developed
microprocessors on the large scale, beginning with 4-bit devices and
then upgrading to 8-bit and 16-bit products. The microprocessors were
first utilized for industrial aims, but then applied to home electronics,
computers, and cars. In 1972, Japan presented the world´s first calculator with a CMOS LSI (Complementary Metal-Oxide Semiconductor
Large Scale Integration) circuit, produced jointly by Toshiba and Sharp.
Using low-cost domestic production and being supported by MITI and
the local banks, Japan developed high quality chips, which, in 1980,
caused Hewlett-Packard to announce “that the Japanese 16K DRAMs
were of far higher quality than those made in the United States.”51
PART 2: SEMICONDUCTORS – THE UNDERLYING ECOSYSTEM

52

From the beginning, the U.S. military-industrial complex was confronted with a Japanese bureaucracy-business–banking infrastructure.53
THE ECOSYSTEM IN THE U.S.
The ecosystem in the U.S. was very different from the one in Japan.
The starting points in the U.S. were the military forces54 and space
agencies, especially the Navy, the Army, NASA, and the AEC/DOE
(Atomic Energy Commission and the Department of Energy).55 The tradition started during the Second World War when semiconductor research was used for improving radar systems. 56 In 1949, the Govern-

49. Id.
50. For the increasing number of US patents granted to Japanese companies starting in 1962, see JOHN E. TILTON, INTERNATIONAL DIFFUSION OF TECHNOLOGY: THE CASE
OF SEMICONDUCTORS 141 tbl.6-2 (1971).
51. ALFRED D. CHANDLER, INVENTING THE ELECTRONIC CENTURY 130 (2005).
52. Werner Ballhaus, Alessandro Pagella, Constantin Vogel & Christoph Wilmsmeier, Faster, Greener, Smarter – Reaching Beyond the Horizon in the World of Semiconductors
(2012),
http://www.pwc.com/en_GX/gx/technology/publications/assets/semiconductor-industryanalysis-and-projections.pdf.
53. COMPETITIVE EDGE, supra note 48 at 16.
54. CHANDLER, supra note 52 at 130.
55. See generally MISMANAGED TRADE?, supra note 10.
56. Richard C. Levin, The Semiconductor Industry, in GOVERNMENT AND
TECHNICAL PROGRESS: A CROSS INDUSTRY ANALYSIS 67 (Richard R. Nelson ed., 1982).
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ment granted big research funds to Bell for the first time. 57 More money was given to the new Silicon Valley start-ups from 1956.58 Between
1952 and 1964, Signal Corps spent about $50 million for semiconductor
engineering.59 The Government responded to new developments very
quickly and flexibly.60 Therefore, the key factor for the start of the U.S.
semiconductor industry was government research.61
The Government not only funded research in that area, but was also responsible for the public procurement of semiconductor devices. For
instance, in 1952, all of the Western Electric´s sales and virtually all of
the rest went to the military.62 To a certain degree, non-military uses of
ICs were caused mainly as a kind of spill-over from military research63.
The government backing was linked to an aggressive funding and
development policy in favor of Californian universities, such as Stanford, Berkeley, and Caltech. These universities managed to oversize the
traditional predominance of the Boston research centers, such as MIT,
quite rapidly. They could trust the intelligence of young researchers
educated by Ivy League universities and the Government was ready to
support fresh research in small university expert groups or start-ups.
At the end of the 1960s, participants in the industry, including universities, changed their strategies to align with the companies more interested in mass-production of microchips, and with universities interested
in organic microchips and other “exotic visions.” 64
From a business perspective, the driving force at the early times
was only one company, AT&T, with Bell Laboratories as its research
unit and Western Electric as its manufacturing arm. This company was
responsible for one of the striking features in the early semiconductor
industry, its cross-licensing strategies and the high mobility 65 of scientists and engineers. A unique situation arose when AT&T was forced
by the antitrust Decree of 195666 to refrain from selling semiconductors
57. J. Kraus, An Economic Study of the US Semiconductor Industry, PhD thesis,
New York (1973).
58. Levin, supra note 57.
59. ERNEST BRAUN & STUART MACDONALD, REVOLUTION IN MINIATURE: THE
HISTORY AND IMPACT OF SEMICONDUCTOR ELECTRONICS 71 (1978).
60. Levin, supra note 57 at 68.
61. This result is supported by the new publication of MARIANA MAZZUCATO, THE
ENTREPRENEURIAL STATE: DEBUNKING PUBLIC VS. PRIVATE SECTOR MYTHS (2013).
62. Levin, supra note 57 at 59 tbl.2.16 (citing J. KRAUS, AN ECONOMIC STUDY OF
THE US SEMICONDUCTOR INDUSTRY, PhD thesis, New York (1973)).
63. Levin, supra note 57 at 64.
64. Id. at 47.
65. For this specific feature see Neus Palomeras, Markets for Inventors: Examining
Mobility Patterns of Engineers in the Semiconductor Industry, 1-10 (2004), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=875284.
66. United States v. Western Elec. Co., 1956 Trade Cas. (CCH) ¶ 68, 246 (D.N.J.
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commercially. All these U.S. particularities led to the existence of a
combination of several receiving tube firms cooperating with start-ups.
The start-ups consisted of companies that had not produced vacuum
tubes in the past and could therefore start manufacturing semiconductors. These companies included Motorola, Transitron, established in
1952, or Texas Instruments, a former geophysical company. 67 A unique
start-up situation was caused by Shockley who quickly erected and
changed the company structure for the promotion of his invention of the
transistor (from Bell to Shockley Laboratories to Beckman Instrument
with eight of his employees establishing Fairchild Camera and Instruments).68 Regarding the industry, Bell Labs and the old receiving-tube
suppliers were predominant in the early days. 69 However, small startups were very important, as they had a substantial impact on advancing mainstream semiconductor technology along its dominant miniaturization trajectory.70 At the end of the 1950s, the former start-up companies Motorola, TI, and Fairchild Semiconductor were the world
leading producers in transistors in terms of revenue.71
In the beginning, the chip industry in the U.S. was not organized
and represented by a single lobbyist association. Since 1977, the Semiconductor Industry Association (SIA) has been the voice of the U.S.
semiconductor industry.72 The SIA was established by five microelectronics pioneers, representing over 80% of the U.S. semiconductor production. In 1988, the SIA helped found the National Advisory Committee on Semiconductors (NACS), a presidential committee with eight
private CEOs and eight Officials. Between 1989 and 1992, the NACS
edited various recommendations for strengthening the U.S. semiconductor industry. In 1994, six CEOs of fabless companies established the
Fabless Semiconductor Association (FSA) to promote the fabless business-model globally. In December 2007, the FSA altered its business
model to become the GSA, the Global Semiconductor Alliance.
The U.S. Government organized further projects, for example the
Semiconductor Research Corporation (SRC) in 1982 and SEMATECH in
1987. SEMATECH received its funding from the public research agency DARPA that financed almost 50% of the consortium’s budget and
Jan. 24, 1956).
67. TILTON, supra note 51 at 50.
68. Id. at 51.
69. Levin, supra note 57 at 49.
70. Id. at 56.
71. CHANDLER, supra note 52 at 124.
72. See also Richard N. Langlois & W. Edward Steinmueller, Strategy and Circum-

stances: The Response of American Firms to Japanese Competition in Semiconductors,
1980-1995 (1999), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=204093.
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thereby gained access to all rights and trade secrets involved. 73 With a
budget of $ 500 million, Sematech was sponsoring the development and
production of U.S.-made ultra-thin circuity chips in response to the
Japanese DRAM success story. The sponsoring was finished in 1996 as
foreign companies like Hyundai, Infineon or ST Microelectronics joined
the project. Today these corporations are not funded or organized by
national states anymore. Due to the specialties of the semiconductor
industry, the Industry came back to its self-regulation roots. “New alliances were also formed, such as the Common Platform Consortium
composed of IBM and Samsung and partnering with Infineon, Freescale, STMicroelectronics and Toshiba.”74 The success of SEMATECH
has been discussed controversially in literature 75 although most authors
regard SEMATECH as a success story.76
AND JAPAN?
The situation was different in Japan. 77 Military procurement had
no impact in Japan as Japan was not allowed to have an army after the
Second World War. The country was relatively poor and had a lot of
cheap labor forces (such as in China today). Therefore, the country was
attractive as a place for producing chips. There were, however, no wholly owned foreign subsidiaries at this time. 78 As mentioned above, the
producers of receiving tubes which started producing chips in 1957 consisted of Hitachi, Toshiba, Matsushita Electric, Nippon Electric,
Mitsubishi Electronic, and Kobe Kogyo (part of Fujitsu). 79 However, the
pioneer of producing commercial transistors was not one of these eight
companies, but a new firm called Sony. Start-ups also did not have any
impact of the semiconductor development.80 The development of semi73. See Memorandum of Understanding between SEMATECH, Inc. and the U.S.
Department of Defense (1998)(on file with author).
74. Sacha Wunsch-Vincent, OECD Information Technology Outlook 168 (2008),
http://uploadi.www.ris.org/editor/12338245519308041E.pdf.
75. See the critical remarks in Robert M. Byron, SEMATECH – A Case Study:
Analysis
of
a
Government-Industry
Partnership
(1993),
http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a273166.pdf; Advisory Council on Federal Participation
in
SEMATECH,
SEMATCH
–
Progress
and
Prospects
(1989),
http://www.dod.mil/pubs/foi/Science_and_Technology/DARPA/10_F_0709Report_of_theAd
visoryCouncil_onFederalParticipation_inSEMATECH_1989.pdf.
76. See for example Dan W. Holladay, Testimony before the Senate Committee in
Energy
and
Natural
Resources
(June
2012),
http://www.energy.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/files/serve?File_id=aa4e2db1-2ae9-42a787be-7c4f21134524.
77. D. I. OKIMOTO, BETWEEN MITI AND THE MARKET. JAPANESE INDUSTRIAL POLICY
FOR HIGH TECHNOLOGY (1989)[hereinafter MITI AND THE MARKET].
78. TILTON, supra note 51 at 136.
79. ELECTRONIC BUYERS, supra note 33.
80. See the figures of US patents granted to Japanese companies starting in 1962 in
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conductors was mainly focused on commercial applications such as calculators or radios.
Yet, the U.S. and Japanese governments increasingly interfered in
the industry by forcing preferential treatment for their national firms.
In military procurement cases, foreign bids were increased by 50% since
1962.81 From the beginning, the Japanese government tried to use its
powers to prohibit the formation of semiconductor firms controlled by
foreign stakeholders. The government, however, also controlled the licensing agreements between Japanese and U.S. companies which needed to get an official state permission. Furthermore, Texas Instruments
was not allowed to establish a wholly owned subsidiary in the early
1960s. Furthermore, the examination of a patent application by TI was
delayed for decades. In 1968, after five years of negotiation, TI agreed to
a joint venture with Sony, with each firm holding 50% of the equity.
Furthermore, TI agreed to license its IC patents to all Japanese companies. This strategy gave the Japanese industry an opportunity to build
up economies of scale.82
The Japanese success model was also based on the idea of life-time
employment.83 As a kind of tradition, Japanese workers did not change
their jobs so often; they were more interested in building a career within the same company during their lifetime. The company thus had a
guarantee that knowledge is not disseminated and lost in the case of an
acquittal. The know-how would remain within the company and only
used internally.84
Another feature of the Japanese model was the national banking
sector that actively supported the semiconductors “made in Japan.” 85
Financial power was abundantly available for investment in new technologies. Japanese banks were allowed to acquire equity shares in companies to which they lend, dissimilar to U.S. banks which were refrained from doing so according to the Glass-Steagall Act of 1933. 86
Therefore, the banks could support Sony & Co. even in times when
TILTON, supra note 51 at 141 tbl.6-2 (showing that the patents were granted to the receiving tube firms.)
TILTON, supra note 51 at 36; Robert Skole, Government Electronic: Federal Outlets
Tough for Foreigner, 41 ELECTRONICS 119-24, December 1968.
82. Marie Anchordoguy, Mastering the Market: Japanese Government Targeting of
the Computer Industry, 42 INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION, No. 3 (1988).
83. See JAMES C. ABEGGLEN, MANAGEMENT AND WORKER – THE JAPANESE
SOLUTION (1973).
84. COMPETITIVE EDGE, supra note 48 at 5.
85. See id. at 151-53.
86. Id. at 7.
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there was no return of investment. This cooperation was based on the
old corporate models in Japanese society, called keiretsus, informally
linking Sony with the Mitsui Bank.87
One of the striking actors in this area was, and still is, MITI, the
Japanese Ministry of International Trade and Industry. 88 From 1949 to
2001, the ministry promoted the interests of Japanese industry together
with the Bank of Japan and various others regulatory bodies. MITI was
the central motor for the semiconductor industrial policy in Japan. In
1957, the Electronics Industry Promotion Law was established, inaugurating MITI as “genyoku”, the central leader of electronics industry. 89 It
has to be taken into account that until 1964, imports of foreign technologies were regulated by the Act on Foreign Capital and had to be individually reviewed by the Foreign Investment Council before approval.
The amount of foreign currency reserves in Japan was low at the time;
and MITI published guidelines to control technology imports. 90 The
ministry had the advantage that the Japanese antitrust control system
was rather lax at these times. The responsible FTC had problems in
regulating the cooperation between state and industry and almost never complained about activities of MITI. 91 The power of MITI was increased by the fact that the Japanese state is highly centralized. Furthermore, the Japanese regulatory control is not achieved through
unilateral decree (as in the U.S.), by but by voluntary compliance. 92
From the beginning, MITI supported public-private research partnerships, a pioneering concept for corporations in other ICT areas. They
put in a lot of effort (especially by funding) in the 1970s to get domestic
semiconductor manufacturers to pool R&D resources. 93 In 1976, they
established a kind of supercomputer cooperation, the so-called Very
Large-Scale Integration (VLSI) Consortium including Fujitsu, NEC, Hitachi, Mitsubishi, and Toshiba.94

87.

Fable

See however the critical remarks of Yoshira Miwa & J. Mark Ramseyer, The
of
the
Keiretsu
(2001),

http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/olin_center/papers/pdf/316.pdf [March 17, 2015].
88. MITI AND THE MARKET, supra note 78; CHALMERS JOHNSON, MITI AND THE
JAPANESE MIRACLE – THE GROWTH OF THE INDUSTRIAL POLICY, 1925-1975 (1982) (In my
view, who is underestimating the importance of MITI).
89. MISMANAGED TRADE?, supra note 10 at 53.
90. Y. Wakumoto & K. Nakano, License as Management Strategy, Akamon Management Review 1-44 (2005), retrieved from: http://www.gbrc.jp/.
91. MITI AND THE MARKET, supra note 78 at 13.
92. Id. at 15.
93. KENNETH FLAMM, CREATING THE COMPUTER: GOVERNMENT, INDUSTRY, AND
HIGH TECHNOLOGY 184-92 (1988).
94. The effect of this consortium is disputed; see SCOTT GALLON, DIVIDED SUN: MITI
AND THE BREAKDOWN OF JAPANESE HIGH-TECH INDUSTRIAL POLICY, 1975-1993 (1995).
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PART 3: SEMICONDUCTORS AND THE IP SYSTEM
Although thousands of patents were granted for the semiconductor
processes and functions, the layout of semiconductors have historically
been held as incapable of traditional IP protection.95 The inadequacy of
patent or copyright law systems to cope with microchips was the official
reason for the U.S. government to force the IP world into a new sui generis protection regime for semiconductors, which proved to be unsuitable at the end (see below). Several causes for the inadequacy of the traditional IP system were discussed in literature. Patent protection was
considered to last too long considering the integrated circuit's useful
commercial life of less than one year.96 In addition, patent protection
was considered useless as most layouts of IC were seen as obvious variations of prior layouts.97 Furthermore, another criticism98 was that the
circuit layout could not be described in the form of a valid patent, i.e.
verbally. But this approach is dubious. Of course, a drawing is not patentable and can only be used in the patent application for illustration.
But, this is not an inadequacy of the patent system. It is an inherent element of patent law that the design and layout are not patentable (unless it contains an invention). However, Patent law is capable of protecting the whole physical range of semiconductor devices, from the
methods of fabrication to new application of semiconductors in final
electronic products.
Protection regimes for industrial designs, such as the Australian
Designs Act and the British Registered Designs Act 1949, are incapable
of being applied to tiny designs, i.e. microscopic engravings or designs
within sealed containment. In addition, these regulations can only be
used for ornamental and aesthetic aspects of designs, excluding functional aspects. The same applies for copyright law. In general, the design of a microchip is itself not a suitable object of copyright law due to
its utilitarian nature.99 It is, in fact, dubious whether such designs em95. John G. Rauch, The Realities of Our Times: The Semiconductor Chip Protection
Act of 1984 and the Evolution of the Semiconductor Industry, 3 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP.
MEDIA & ENT. L. J. 403, 408 (1993).
96. Robert L. Risberg, Jr., Five Years Without Infringement Litigation Under The

Semiconductor Chip Protection Act: Unmasking the Specter of Chip Piracy in an Era of
Diverse and Incompatible Technologies, 1990 WIS. L. REV. 241, 252 (1990); see also Jonathan H. Lemberg, Semiconductor Protection: Foreign Responses to a U.S. Initiative, 25
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 345, 348 (1987).
97. Carl A. Kukkonen, III, The Need to Abolish Registration for Integrated Circuit
Topographies Under TRIPS, 38 IDEA 105, 107 (1997).
98. Levin, supra note 57 at 80.
99. Universal Furniture Int’l, Inc. v. Collezione Europa USA, Inc., 196 F. App’x 166,
171 (4th Cir. 2006) (finding that furniture design is not copyrightable when the design
aspects serve a mainly functional purpose); see also Brandir Int’l, Inc. v. Cascade Pac.
Lumber Co., 834 F.2d 1142, 1143, 1148 (2d Cir. 1987) (holding that a squiggle-designed
“ribbon” bicycle rack was a useful article and thus not copyrightable); ConWest Res., Inc.
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body artistic merits or reflect a certain degree of individual and personal creativity. Moreover, U.S. experts100 expressed the view (however unjustified) that the European concept of droit moral might cause problems in the chip industry.
Astonishingly, almost no one discussed the protection of semiconductors as trade secrets or the general application of rules of unfair
competition law.101 As patent law did not preempt state trade secrets
law,102 many U.S. states adopted the Uniform Trade Secrets Act
(UTSA). The UTSA prohibits the disclosure or use of a trade secret if
the infringer uses improper means to get knowledge of the trade secret.
But, due to the high mobility of the semiconductor experts, there was a
constant flow of experts from one company to another which undermined a possible trade secret protection (see above). Finally, trade secret protection is not very helpful against reverse engineering of goods
sold on the open market. As a consequence, trade secret laws seemed
inadequate as the high mobility of experts and networking structure of
the semiconductor industry undermined any chance to enforce trade secret rules (see below). Surprisingly, undiscussed was the fact that many
states could have offered a protection against slavish copying under
competition law.103 The U.S. however seems to fear that this protection
regime would overly restrict the use of reverse engineering in the chip
industry and hinted to the fact that the duration of protection under
these rules might be inappropriate.104 Therefore, the chip industry was
struggling hard to find any protection tool. Consequentially, the story of
v. Playtime novelties, Inc., 84 U.S.P.Q.2d 101, 1023-24 (N.D. Cal. 2006) (determining that
design aspects of body part sculptures were not separable from their utilitarian functions). See Steven P. Kasch, The Semiconductor Chip Protection Act: Past, Present, and
Future,
7
BERKELEY
TECH.
L.
J.
79-80
(1992),
http://scholarship.law.berkeley.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1100&context=btlj [March
17, 2015]; James Chesser, Semiconductor Chip Protection: Changing Roles for Copyright
and Competition, 71 VA. L. REV. 249, March 1985. However, there are court decisions in
the UK which held that mask works are protectable under copyright law in that chips
may be considered "copies" of the technical drawings for the chips (L. B. (Plastics) Ltd. v.
Swish Products Ltd. (1979)). The Swish doctrine is very controversial even in the UK; see

Green Paper on Reform of the Law Relating to Copyright, Design and Performers Protection (Cmnd 8302); R. J. Hart, Legally Protecting Semiconductor Chips in the U. K., 9 EUR.
INTELL. PROP. REV. 260 (1985).
100. Richard H. Stern, The Semiconductor Chip Protection Act of 1984: The International Comity of Industrial Property, 3 BERKELEY J. INT’L LAW 273, 297 (Winter 1986).
101. See International News Service v. Associated Press, 39 S. CT. 68 (1918); Levin,
supra note 57 at 82.
102. Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 94 S. CT. 1879, 1882 (1974).
103. CHRISTINE FELLNER, THE FUTURE OF LEGAL PROTECTION FOR INDUSTRIAL
DESIGN 101-04 (1985).
104. Richard H. Stern, The Semiconductor Chip Protection Act of 1984: The International Comity of Industrial Property, 3 BERKELEY J. INT’L LAW 30, 296 (Winter 1986).
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IP and microchips is a long story, with several regulatory phases.
PHASE 1: CROSS-LICENSING (1950–1980)
Until 1939, independent university centres combining the
knowledge of physicists, mathematicians, and chemists organized research on semiconductors. During these early days of “lone inventors,”
research was conducted to advance fundamental knowledge, with little
thought of practical use. This academic approach was used in Europe
even after the Second World War so that Mataré and others were talking about new concepts at conferences without seeking patent protection beforehand.
In the U.S., the situation changed during the Second World War
when U.S. military forces stressed the use of patent protection for these
new technologies.105 While the Europeans were talking at conferences,
the U.S. experts were applying for patents. Nevertheless, the semiconductor industry was still characterized by its openness and transparency after the Second World War. 106 The technological features were created by U.S. engineers who asked for patent protection for the basics of
their inventions, but also opened their “books” for other researchers
throughout the world. For instance, Bell had the vision of sharing the
new technology with other experts around the globe in order to support
innovation. Therefore, Bell organized three meetings for international
scientists to inform them about the new semiconductor technology first
hand. In April 1952, Bell welcomed over 100 representatives from 40
companies (including GE, Sony, Texas Instruments, etc.) at the last Bell
conference.107 People interested in that conference had to pay a $25,000
patent-licensing fee upfront, deductible against future royalties and
were allowed to visit the nine-day Transistor Technology Symposium,
including a tour through Western Electric's transistor factory in Allen-

105. See generally “French Transistor,” supra note 25.
106. It is misleading to state that the inventors of the Bell transistor did not recognize the potential of their ideas as especially Mark A. Lemley did in The Economics of Improvement in Intellectual Property Law, 75 TEX. L. REV. 989 (1997) or in Mark A. Lemley
& R. Anthony Reese, Reducing Digital Copyright Infringement Without Restricting Innovation, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1345, 1345-54, 1373-1426 (2004). Bell had a clear patent application strategy, but did not enforce the patents via litigation. Furthermore, the bell “cookbook” demonstrates that Bell has clearly foreseen the usability of the transistors in radio,
phone and TV.
107. CHANDLER, supra note 52 at 122. The three symposia were attended by representatives of universities and delegates of European and US companies. Japanese experts
were however not present. As a matter of fact, official lists of attendees did not exist, only
a group of conference photos. For an analysis of the people attending the conferences see
F. M. SMITS, A HISTORY OF ENGINEERING AND SCIENCE IN THE BELL SYSTEM: ELECTRONICS
TECHNOLOGY (1925-1975) 28-29 (1985); MISMANAGED TRADE?, supra note 10 at 41 n.7.
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town, PA.108 The proceedings of these conferences ( The Transistor) were
named "Ma Bell's Cookbook" and became the leading directory for global semiconductor research in the 1950s. Starting from that point, a lot
of U.S. and international companies asked for licenses from Bell. 109
The famous patents of Bell, licensed according to the Bell cookbook,
were licensed on the condition that the licensee makes his own patents
available at a fair price.110 The IP system was considered slow and too
complicated to cope with the necessities of the quick growing, young
semiconductor industry where small start-up companies need a mentality of a free exchange of ideas to improve their ICs. Thus, the semiconductor industry extensively relied on the cross-licensing model.111 However, in 1998, the system was heavily under attack by the Federal
Trade Commission, which held that the enforcement of a cross-licensing
system by Intel was anti-competitive and a misuse of monopoly power.112
Bell used open strategies because of the antitrust policy problem. In
January 1949, the Department of Justice opened an antitrust case
against Western Electric and its parent company AT & T due to the fact
AT & T and three other companies established a patent pool in 1932.113
The case was settled by a consent decree in January 1956. 114 AT & T
agreed in this decree to grant royalty-free licenses on any patent issued
before the time of the decree to any applicant. All future Bell patents
108. The attendants were however to a certain extent disappointed about the information policy of Bell. For instance, John Saby, inventor of the alloy junction transistor at
General Electric, stated that, “In crystal growing, for example, Gordon Teal wrote papers
on crystal growing, but never disclosed a lot of the details of the process to get the crystals
to grow. People who grew crystals generally had to discover themselves, and people in academia were teed off by this because Bell would print all these things, but they didn’t really tell you how to make crystals that you could perform independent research on, unless
you got down on your knees and ask them for a piece of crystal.” Oral-History: John Saby,
ENGINEERING AND TECHNOLOGY HISTORY WIKI, ethw.org/Oral-History:John_Saby (last
visited Feb. 5, 2016).
109. See Hyungsub Choi, The Boundaries of Industrial Research: Making Transistors at RCA, 1948-1960, 48 TECHNOLOGY AND CULTURE 758-82 (2007).
110. Levin, supra note 57 at 80.
111. See Carl Shapiro, Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross-Licenses, Patent Pools,
and Standard Setting, in 1 INNOVATION POLICY AND THE ECONOMY 119 (Adam B. Jaffe,
Josh Lerner & Scott Stern eds., 2001); CARL SHAPIRO, TECHNOLOGY CROSS-LICENSING
PRACTICES: FTC V. INTEL (1999); Albert Galasso, Cross-License Agreements in the Semiconductor Industry: Waiting to Persuade? (2006), available at http://www.innotec.bwl.uni-muenchen.de/files/service/links/epip/alberto_galasso.pdf.
112. The case was also part of a civil law litigation: Intergraph Corp. v. Intel Corp.,
195 F.3d 1346, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
113. Levin, supra note 57 at 75.
114. Id.
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would be available with reasonable royalties on any of its patents
sought by the Bell system. In addition, the decree barred AT & T from
“engaging in any business other than the furnishing of common carrier
communications services.”115 In literature,116 it was argued that this
consent decree did little more than ratify the existing corporate policy.
In fact, Bell employees already published articles in 1949 that Bell was
willing “to make available on reasonable terms to all who desire them
non-exclusive licenses under its patents for any use.” 117 Bell traditionally asked for cross-licensing agreements.118 The company had the fear
that the invention of the transistor and its consequences were so big
that “we couldn´t keep it to ourselves and we couldn´t make all the
technical contributions.”119 Therefore, Bell opened its laboratories by
organizing conferences and publishing handbooks thereby transferring
knowledge to its competitors. Due to the consent decrees with U.S. antitrust authorities signed in the 1950s, the “technological giants” in semiconductor production, largely IBM and AT&T, were effectively curtailed
from enforcing patent rights against rival firms throughout the 1960s
and 1970s.120 Insofar, the antitrust regulation incentivized innovation
at least on the long run.
Existing patents were thus either cross-licensed or to a certain degree ignored.121 The problem with patents in the European semiconductor business was that nobody really knew who the inventor of which element was. For instance, the name, Shockley, was left off the patent
application after lawyers of Bell found that Shockley´s writings on tran115.
116.
117.

Id.
Id.

K. S. McHugh, Bell System Patents and Patent Licensing, BELL TELEPHONE
MAGAZINE, 1-4 (1949).
118. A. M. Golding, The Semiconductor Industry in Britain and the United States: A
case study in Innovation, Growth, and Diffusion of Technology, PhD thesis University of
Sussex (1971).
119. Morton/Bell cited in TILTON, supra note 51.
120. Levin, supra note 57; Bronwyn H. Rosemarie Ham Ziedonis, An Empirical
Analysis of Patent Litigation in the Semiconductor Industry 7 (Jan. 2007),
http://eml.berkeley.edu/~bhhall/papers/HallZiedonis07_PatentLitigation_AEA.pdf
(last
visited Mar. 17, 2015)(hereinafter Hall & Ziedonis I). AT&T applied this open strategy
even in the 1970. See Robert E. Kerwin & Richard A. DeFelice, Silicon for the Masses:

How AT&T Licensed its IP in the 1970s to Facilitate the Development of a Worldwide
Semiconductor Industry, in INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC NEGOTIATION: MODEL VERSUS
REALITY 229 (Viktor Aleksandrovich Kremeni︠u︡k & Gunnar Sjöstedt eds., 2002).
121. Eric von Hippel, Appropriability of Innovation Benefit as a Predictor of the
Source of Innovation, RESEARCH POLICY 95-116 (1982). Bigger Japanese companies were
also fond of cross-licensing models. See Kazuyuki Motohashi, Licensing or Not licensing?
An Empirical Analysis of the Strategic Use of Patents by Japanese Firms , 37 RESEARCH
POLICY 1548-55 (2008); Melissa M. Appleyard, How Does Knowledge Flow? Interfirm Patterns in the Semiconductor Industry, 17 STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT 137-54 (1996).
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sistors were “highly influenced” by an earlier 1925 patent granted to Lilienfeld.122 Furthermore, the big players, Fairchild and Texas Instruments, sued each other for patent infringement; in a 1966 settlement,
each party dropped its opposition and agreed not to dispute its rival’s
patents for a period of ten years.123 These companies closed crosslicensing agreements and invited others to join in the distribution and
enhancement of their results. Arguments about trade secrets were unknown.124 One of the big symbols of this spirit was the instrument of reverse engineering that allowed all semiconductor companies to check
the interiors of circuits produced by competitors. 125 Years later, we call
this practice of knowledge sharing the “industry norm of competition.”
“The industry spokespersons, while seeking protection from piracy as
they perceived it, were insistent on preserving and encouraging the industry practices of creative copying, a practice known to them as reverse engineering.”126
Throughout the whole discussion on the SCPA all experts held that
the examination of the technical details of a competing chip is important and should be legal in order to obtain improved chip designs. As
a result, many semiconductor companies avoided the process of enforcing or licensing existing patents. 127 As statistics show, patent court proceedings started in 1973 on a very low level and highly increased only
from 1983.128
PHASE 2: THE JAPANESE – U.S. CHIP-WAR AND THE SEARCH FOR
EFFECTIVE PROTECTIVE MEASURES (1980–1984)
More and more, the press noted that semiconductors were “America´s most promising growth industry.”129 Indeed, the situation changed
in the 1980s, especially with the substantial investment required for
122. WILLIAM SHOCKLEY, ELECTRONS AND HOLES IN SEMICONDUCTORS: WITH
APPLICATIONS TO TRANSISTOR ELECTRONICS (1956).
123. W. F. Finance, The International Transfer of Semiconductor Technology
through US Based Firms, NBER (NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH) WORKING
PAPER NO. 118 (1975).
124. However, companies like Bell Labs had a clear sense for the importance of secrecy requirements prior to a patent application; see MICHAEL RIORDAN & LILLIAN
HODDESON, CRYSTAL FIRE: THE BIRTH OF THE INFORMATION AGE 150 (1997).
125. For technical details on Reverse Engineering, see FLORIAN SCHWEYER, DIE
RECHTLICHE BEWERTUNG DES REVERSE ENGINEERING IN DEUTSCHLAND UND DEN USA 18
(2012).
126. Leo J. Raskind, Reverse Engineering, Unfair Competition, and Fair Use, 70
MINN. L. REV. 385, 391 (1985).
127. Levin, supra note 57, at 81.
128. Hall & Ziedonis I, supra note 121.
129. H.R. 1007, 96th Cong. (1979).
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VLSI chips.
At this time, there were restrictive trade barriers erected in the
U.S. against European and Asian semiconductor products. The U.S.
government used a “Buy American” policy that required foreign corporations to bid 6% under the lowest bid by an American firm. In military
procurement cases, foreign bids have increased by 50% since 1962. 130
The Japanese Government answered quickly to this preferential treatment for U.S. companies. In 1960, American and Japanese companies
started a patent war over semiconductors that lasted for a decade. The
MITI restricted Fairchild and Texas Instruments from investing in
their IC plants that they built in Japan. 131 Subsequently, the period of
free use was over although it took more than thirty years until the Japanese Patent Office in 1989 granted patent rights in ICs to Texas Instruments.132 This explains why the U.S. industry really fought for a sui
generis protection semiconductor. It is not that the existing IPs were
ineffective but a new sui generis right would help in a trade war especially due to the fact that a new right could only be enforced internationally on the basis of reciprocity.
The Semiconductor sui generis protection right was an invention of
Intel and its counsel Roger Borovoy. After a first attempt of the U.S.
Senate to extend copyright protection to integrated circuits failed, 133 the
lobbyists who represented the interests of the Californian semiconductor industry fought together with the U.S. House of Representatives 134
130. TILTON, supra note 51, at 36.; Skole, supra note 82, at 119-24.
131. MISMANAGED TRADE?, supra note 10, at 56-59. Further details can be found in
the US based report of MARK MASON, AMERICAN MULTINATIONALS IN JAPAN: THE
POLITICAL ECONOMY OF JAPANESE CAPITAL CONTROLS 1899-1980 176-87 (1992); for the
Japanese perspective see NAKAGAWA, supra note 47, at 154-66.
132. Thomas C. Hayes, Japan Grip Still Seen On Patents, N. Y. TIMES, Nov. 24,
1989, http://www.nytimes.com/1989/11/24/business/japan-grip-still-seen-on-patents.html
(last visited Mar. 17, 2015). But even then, TI failed to enforce its patent rights in Japan.
For instance in 1994, a Japanese court ruled that Fujitsu Ltd. had not violated the Kilby
patent, because the patent described particular technical details that Fujitsu did not use
in two of its recent computer chips, see Edmund L. Andrews, Company News: Texas Instruments Loses in Japanese Ruling, N. Y. TIMES, Sep. 1, 1994,
http://www.nytimes.com/1994/09/01/business/company-news-texas-instruments-loses-injapanese-ruling.html (last visited Mar. 17, 2015).
133. H.R. 1007, 96th Cong. (1979) adding to § 101 Copyright Act: “Such pictorial,
graphic and sculptural works shall also include the photographic masks used to imprint
patterns on integrated circuit chips and include the imprinted patterns themselves even
though they are used in connection with the manufacture of, or, incorporated in a useful
article.”
134. In a note to the author, Richard Stern (n.1) tracked back the opposition of the
House against the copyright approach to Congressman Robert Kastenmeier, chairman of
the House Judiciary Committee’s IP subcommittee. See R. Kastenmeier & M. J. Reming-
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for a separate protection regime. The lobbyists used several arguments
for that approach: The development of an IC involves around 500 process steps which take more than two years and includes the know-how
from thousands of engineers. So the lobbyists argued that this exposed
them to an increasing number of copyists. Furthermore, the lobbyists
claimed that existing national patent laws failed to give sufficient protection to this economic sector, because they required a high standard of
inventiveness. Patent protection seemed too complex and bureaucratic,
especially the requirement of a full verbal description of the circuit layout.135 As they argued in Congress, companies needed to register thousands of semiconductor devices for patent protection in order to get protection for a single IC. The copyright system was inefficient in cases of
copying the pattern on the chip itself if the Copyright Office deemed the
pattern was inseparable from the utilitarian function of the chip.136 In
addition and in fact, the final chip configuration is only the result of a
lot of drawings; unauthorized duplication usually came from the finished chip and not from drawings or masks. 137
The most striking argument was the “Japanese threat.” 138 Japanese
corporations had a strong interest in the technology and cooperated
very early with Silicon Valley. U.S. and Japanese producers cooperated
via cross-licensing agreements. But then the open exchange of ideas
changed dramatically when the Americans noticed the increasing economic success of Japanese silicon companies. At the parliamentary
hearing, the president of Intel presented photos of a Toshiba chip that
was an exact copy of the Intel chip 2147 according to his statement.139
The Toshiba chip remained the main evidence for Japanese piracy for

ton, The Semiconductor Chip Protection Act of 1984: A Swamp or Firm Ground?, 70
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW 417 (1985).
135. Levin, supra note 57, at 79.
136. As a matter of fact, the Copyright Office had refused to register patterns on
printed circuit boards and semiconductor chips because no separate artistic aspects had
been demonstrated. COPYRIGHT PROTECTION FOR SEMICONDUCTOR CHIPS: HEARINGS
BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON COURTS, CIVIL LIBERTIES, AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF
JUSTICE OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 98TH CONG.,
1ST
SESS.,
ON
H.
R:
1028
77
(1983),
http://www.ipmall.info/hosted_resources/lipa/trademarks/Copyright%20Protection%20for
%20Semiconductor%20Chips,%20Subcomm.%20%28Aug.%203%20AND%20Dec.%201,%2
01983%29.pdf (last visited Mar. 17, 2015) [hereinafter COPYRIGHT HEARINGS].
137. Id.
138. Rauch, supra 96, at 407; Daniel E. Tierney, The United States – Japan Semi-

conductor Controversy: A Strategic Guide to the Use of U.S. Trade Laws as a Legal and
Political Instrument, 52. ALB. L. REV. 363 (1987-1988); Eugene Volokh, The Semiconductor Industry and Foreign Competition, CATO POLICY ANALYSIS NO. 99, (Jan. 1988),
http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa099.html (last visited Mar. 17, 2015).
139. COPYRIGHT HEARINGS, supra note 137.
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decades.140 Nobody, however, checked the evidence. Actually, the chips
were very different. Toshiba produced a smaller chip in a double metal
process which organized the transistor patterns in vertical columns.
The Intel chip was bigger with horizontally organized transistors produced in a single metal process.141
Eventually, the term “chip piracy” was invented and is entirely useless. If there is no protection for chips, the “pirate” is not a pirate. Nevertheless, there was a very big discussion between the House and the
Senate how to structure an effective system for fighting chip piracy. The
Senate opted for an extension of the copyright act. 142 The House was in
favor of a new system of industrial property protection. 143 The concept of
the House (based on the ideas of Intel) was mainly justified by the idea
that a new system of protection allowed the United States to force foreign nations to integrate this new protection system in their national
legislation.144 The copyright solution was a problem as the Universal
Copyright Convention mainly relates to works of applied art and allows
no other industrial products to be protected. 145 Finally, the Congress favored the idea of sui generis protection for its own semiconductor industry which claimed at that time to be leading worldwide.
PHASE 3: THE SUI-GENERIS-REGIME OF THE SCPA
The Semiconductor Chip Protection Act of 1984 (SCPA),146 created a

140. Years later, a second case was argued in the US press where NEC was held to
have copied the famous INTEL 8086 and 8088 microprocessor in their V20 and V30; see
Dan Morgan, Battling to Innovate and Emulate: Intel versus Nippon Electric,
WASHINGTON POST, May 2, 1983. In 1986, Intel sued NEC for copyright infringement regarding their microcode. In September 1986, Judge Ingram ruled that the electronic instructions known as microcode are eligible for protection under the copyright laws; see
Robert Hinckley, NEC v. Intel: Will Hardware Be Drawn into the Black Hole of Copyright
Editors, 3 SANTA CLARA HIGH TECH. L. J. 23 (1987). This case however only dealt with
software piracy, not with the layout of ICs.
141. Kasch, supra note 100, at 79-80.
142. This approach was taken in S. 1201, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 130 CONG. REC.
S5833-38 (daily ed. May 16, 1984).
143. This model was used in H. R. 5525, 130 CONG. REC. H5524-25 (daily ed. June
11, 1984).
144. H. R. REP Number 781, 7-8.
145. Id.
146. Tide III of Public Law 98-620 of November 8, 1984, now 17. U.S.C. Section 901
et. seq. Enthusiastic descriptions of this Act can be found in Jay Erstling, The Semicon-

ductor Chip Protection Act and its Impact on the International Protection of Chip Designs, 15 RUTGERS UNIVERSITY COMPUTER & TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL (1989),
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1710225; Steven Benz, The Semiconductor Chip Protection Act of 1984 – Experience in the Utilization of the Law and Current
International Developments, 8 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 229, 229 (1986).
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new kind of industrial property containing elements of patent, copyright, and competition law.147 The Act sought to protect the “maskwork.” The “mask” is the pattern that utilizes the circuits on the siliconwafer in order to create the integrated circuit. The term “mask-work”
demonstrates the traces of new sui generis right to copyright law. 148 The
Act uses typical copyright terms when it requires the mask work to be
“original.” The reference to mask works does not fit the SCPA’s intention of protecting against illegal photos of the chip itself. 149
Additionally, the SCPA provides a new way of imposing international pressure. All nations must adopt the main elements of the SCPA.
Otherwise, topographies and mask works of a foreign chip producer
would not be protected in the United States.
In Europe, member states tried to establish harmonized chip protection legislation to conform with the SCPA. Other European states
however resisted the pressure of the United States and created their
own way to protect chips.150
This resistance eventually lead to the rapid preparation of a new
Directive for chip protection by EC authorities after the United States
granted interim for nationals and European domiciles. Soon the Directive on the Legal Protection of Semiconductor Products was adopted
by the EC Council on December 16, 1986 151 in order to harmonise the
composition of legal protection for semiconductor technology. In the Di147. Richard H. Stern, The Semiconductor Chip Protection Act of 1984: The International Comity of Industrial Property, 3 BERKELEY JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, Winter 1986; DAVID LADD, DAVID E. LEIBOWITZ & BRUCE G. JOSEPH, PROTECTION FOR
SEMICONDUCTOR CHIP MASKS IN THE UNITED STATES (1986); Charles N. Quinn, Protecting
Semiconductor Chips in U. S., LA NOUVELLES 95, September (1987); Wade Woodson &
Douglas C. Safreno, The Semiconductor Chip Protection Act of 1984, COMPUTER & HIGH
TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL 7 (1985).
148. Stern, supra note 148 at n.1. The mask work concept had nothing to do with sui
generis. It was an attempt to assimilate the chip protection sought to the copyright pattern of literary works, pictorial works, musical works, etc. But once in the Senate bill it
stayed in and was carried over to the subsequent House bill.
149. COPYRIGHT HEARINGS, supra note 137.
150. Such as the United Kingdom; see Thomas Hoeren, Chip Protection in Europe, in
THE LAW OF INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY IN EUROPE (Corien Prin & Alfred P. Meijboom
eds., 1992), http://www.uni-muenster.de/Jura.itm/hoeren/veroeffentlichungen/036.pdf.
Several states like the Netherlands, UK and Australia informed the US that they will
simply apply their existing copyright legislation to microchips. Australia advised the
United States of such intention in a communication described in 50 FED. REG. 24, 665
(1985); see also 50 FED. REG. 26, 818 (1985). The Netherlands advised the United States
in a communication reprinted in 50 FED. REG. 24, 795, 796-800 (1985). The United Kingdom advised the United States in a communication described in 50 FED. REG. 24, 666-68
(1985).
151. See Thomas Hoeren, Chip Protection in Europe, in THE LAW OF INFORMATION
TECHNOLOGY IN EUROPE, (MAR. 17, 2015), available at http://www.unimuenster.de/Jura.itm/hoeren/veroeffentlichungen/036.pdf.
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rective, member states must achieve certain guidelines in order to benefit from the Directive’s protection in Europe which include:
(1) The protection of the “topography” is essential, not the microchip itself, i.e. “the three-dimensional pattern of the layers of which a
semiconductor product is composed.”152 Unlike the SCPA, this definition
does not use the term "mask-work" to describe the object of chip protection although the term is substantively the same.
(2) The right holder must be a national of an EC member state or
has to start the commercial exploitation within the EC. Otherwise, the
protection depends on special declarations of the member states in
agreement with the Commission (Article 3).
(3) Article 5 provides the right-holder with the exclusive right to
authorize or prohibit the reproduction and commercial exploitation of
the product.
The EC member states had to implement this Directive into national law by November 7, 1987. 153 For example, the Federal Republic of
Germany issued the “Halbleiterschutzgesetz” 154 (Semiconductor Protection Act) on 1st November 1987. Essentially, most of these national acts
mirror the wording of the Directive.
The semiconductor protection acts of the USA and the EC in the
1980s, create a new type of intellectual property right. These acts have
a material reciprocity in common. This is a new way to force other nations not only to accept, but also into adopt this new right in their own
legislation to protect their own semiconductor industries as well. This
new system of material reciprocity was harshly criticized in the succeeding publications.155 It was said to contradict the principles of industrial property law. For centuries, the national treatment principle had
been regarded as the corner stone of international patent and copyright
law.156 Inventions and copyright works had been protected irrespective
152. 1986 O.J. (L24) 36.
153. There were however several mistakes in the implementation of this directive.
The Commission for instance forgot to deal with the problem of the Isle of Man where
most European semiconductor corporations had their seat at this time. The Isle of Man is
not part of the EU. Therefore, the companies seated at the Isle of Man did not enjoy the
sui-generis protection. This gap was closed only ten years later. EUR. CONSULT. ASS. DEB.
96th Sess. 644 (Nov. 11, 1996).
154. Halbleiterschutzgesetz,
Bundesgesetzblatt,
Part
I,
2294
(1987),
http://www.bgbl.de/banzxaver/bgbl/start.xav?startbk=Bundesanzeiger_BGBl&start=//*%2
55B@attr_id=%27bgbl187s2294.pdf%27%255D#__bgbl__%2F%2F*[%40attr_id%3D%27bg
bl187s2294.pdf%27]__1427108083407.
155. Das deutsche, supra note 2.
156. Thomas Dreier, National Treatment, Reciprocity and Retorsion - The Case of
Computer Programs and Integrated Circuits, in GATT OR WIPO? NEW WAYS IN THE
INTERNATIONAL PROPERTY OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 63, 70 (Friedrich-Karl Beier &
Gerhard Schricker eds., 1989).
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of the nationality of their creators or inventors.
The principle of reciprocity was integrated for the first time in industrial property laws.157 Even in the U.S., experts feared that most
other countries might refuse to adopt the U.S. system. The real reason
for the reciprocity was that it created a win-win-situation for the United
States. If a country like Japan adopts the structure of the SCPA, U.S.
companies would obtain a protection for their mask-works within that
country. On the contrary, although unrealistic, if a country like Japan
refuses to grant the protection, the U.S. companies could use the foreign-mask works for free, which would allow for a high transfer of
knowledge. The U.S. Government now had a very useful weapon in the
trade wars against Japan and its increasingly powerful semiconductor
industry.
Additionally, it is beneficial to consider how the U.S. reacted when
other states used the reciprocity “weapon” in IP law. In 1996, the European Union enacted its Directive on the legal protection of databases. 158
To a certain degree, this Directive imitates the U.S. Semiconductor Protection Act’s approach. The Directive establishes a new sui generis right
for databases and combined that approach with the reciprocity rule established in the SCPA (Art. 11). 159 The EU’s attempt to push the U.S. to
integrate a sui generis protection for databases in its legislation was ultimately unsuccessful. Instead, the U.S. Copyright Office complained
that U.S. database producers might get “a competitive disadvantage in
Europe” due to the following rule:
The directive’s failure to provide national treatment may be challenged as an impermissible trade practice, inconsistent with existing
treaty obligations, or as an inappropriate approach to intellectual
property in a global marketplace. 160

The attempted implementation of a sui generis right for databases
in the U.S. was not successful. Today, courts are struggling to implement the rather complex and vague criteria for this protection regime. 161
157. Id. As Richard Stern explained, after the House´s decision to implement a sui
generis right, “it became necessary to put in provisions about international comity. At a
late stage, Janice Teisberg suggested this reciprocity approach instead of the copyright
“universality” approach, as a way to “encourage” foreign countries to give US chip companies protection for chip layouts. Sui generis came first; this was an afterthought.”
158. 1996 O.J. (L96) 9.
159. Silke von Lewinski, Kommentar zur Datenbank-Richtlinie, Artikel 11, in
EUROPÄISCHES URHEBERRECHT (M. Walter et. al. eds., 1999).
160. U.S. Copyright Office, Report on Legal Protection for Databases (1997),
http://www.copyright.gov/reports/dbase.html.
161. See Commission of the European Communities, DG Internal Market and Ser-
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Primarily due to the pressure from the new reciprocity rule, an international agreement on the minimum standards for semiconductor
protection became more and more necessary. As a result, the “Treaty on
the Protection of Intellectual Property in Respect of Integrated Circuits”
(IPIC) was passed in 1989 at the diplomatic conference of the WIPO in
Washington.162 Although the treaty was accepted by the majority of participating countries, it was never ratified. The failure to ratify the Treaty was directly attributable to the protest of the USA and Japan, who
were the leading countries in the production of microchips at the time. 163
The U.S.’s major criticism was the Treaty's eight year protection limitation. The U.S. maintains that important semiconductors, like computer
chips (Intel), have a longer lifespan than eight years. An additional argument of both Japan and the U.S. was strong criticism against the
rules on compulsory licensing in Article 6 (3) IPIC. After the failure of
IPIC, Article 35 to Article 38 of the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (“TRIPS”) Agreement in 1994 began to regulate and
protect semiconductor technology. TRIPS integrates exemptions for
“private purposes,” reverse engineering and innocent infringements. 164
But Article 35 TRIPS Agreement explicitly excludes the controversial
Article 6 (3) IPIC which defines compulsory licensing. According to
TRIPS, each member state is free to decide about the implementation in
their own legal system either as a sui generis law or in existent copyright or patent law.165
As a matter of fact, the structure of all these sui generis regulations
was not very convincing.166 As Article 35 TRIPS Agreement states, it is

vices

Working
Paper
(Dec.
12,
2005),
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/copyright/docs/databases/evaluation_report_en.pdf
(discussing some of the critical features of this approach)[hereinafter Commission of the
European Communities].
162. Thomas Dreier, National Treatment, Reciprocity and Retorsion - The Case of
Computer Programs and Integrated Circuits, in GATT OR WIPO? NEW WAYS IN THE
INTERNATIONAL PROPERTY OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 63, 70 (Friedrich-Karl Beier &
Gerhard Schricker eds., 1989).
163. ALESCH STAEHELIN, DAS TRIPS-ABKOMMEN: IMMATERIALGÜTERRECHTE IM LICHT
DER GLOBALISIERTEN HANDELSPOLITIK 100 (1997).
164. Treaty on Intellectual Property in Respect of Integrated Circuits art. 6(2), May
26, 1989, 6 World Intell. Prop. Org., Copyright and Related Rights Laws and Treaties,
Multilateral Treaties, Text 1-011. [hereinafter Multilateral Treaties].
165. Id.
165. Thomas Hoeren, Das Washingtoner Abkommen zum Schutz des geistigen Eigentums an integrierten Schaltkreisen, NJW 2605, 2606 (1989).
166. That might be one of the reasons why Japan and the United States have not
even modified their semiconductor chip protection since the TRIPS Agreement came into
effect, ten and eleven years after their initial semiconductor legislation.

2015]

THE PROTECTION OF PIONEER INNOVATIONS

179

not the semiconductor product itself, which is the object of protection. 167
Rather, the member states of TRIPS have to provide protection “to the
layout-designs (topographies) of integrated circuits.” 168 This is slightly
different from the wording of the American SCPA, which protects the
“mask-work.” Within TRIPS, other methods in setting the circuits on
the wafer apart from “masks” are protected as well.
The sui-generis protection is a combination of a copyright-like
standard of “originality” and a patent law test of newness. The layoutdesigns are original “in the sense that they are the result of their creators´ own intellectual effort and are not commonplace among creators of
layout-designs (topographies) and manufactures of integrated circuits
at the time of their creation.”169 So, the topography firstly has to show
minimal creativity in its design. Here the regulation uses the typical
copyright standard of “intellectual effort.” It further combines that
standard with the additional requirements of not being “commonplace.”
This criterion resembles the patent law question of novelty although the
negative test of being not commonplace is a lower standard than the criterion of inventiveness. The requirement is more similar to those traditionally used in utility patent law. Insofar as the sui generis approach
tries to combine copyright and patent law standards, making this regime neither fish nor fowl.
Another unsuccessful provisions are those on reverse engineering.170 “Reverse engineering” means to create a new topography by analyzing an existing one. This principle is taken from the U.S. SCPA. 171
According to Article 6 (2) lit. b IPIC, “reverse engineering” means that:
the third party […], on the basis of evaluation or analysis of the protected layout-design (topography) […] creates a layout design (topography) complying with the requirement of originality […], that third
party may incorporate the second layout-design in an integrated circuit […].172

Thus, a third person is allowed to analyze the existing topography
of a microchip from another producer in order to create their own, new
one. The other way around, simply rebuilding the same chip is not “re167. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, art. 35,
Apr. 15, 1994, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299 [hereinafter TRIPS].
168. Id.
169. Multilateral Treaties, supra note 165.
170. See for technical details on Reverse Engineering FLORIAN SCHWEYER, DIE
RECHTLICHE BEWERTUNG DES REVERSE ENGINEERING IN DEUTSCHLAND UND DEN USA 24
(2012).
171. 17 U.S.C. § 906(a)(2).
172. Multilateral Treaties, supra note 165.
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verse engineering.” The topography of the new chip has to fulfill the requirement of originality, in the sense of Article 3 (2) IPIC mentioned
above. Nevertheless, the principle of “reverse engineering” seems to be
defined imprecisely, so that even mere copyists might refer to this principle in order to defend themselves against the right holder if they could
show a “paper trail” to disprove plagiarism. 173
As seen above, the term of protection was a major point of criticism
to the IPIC Treaty on part of the USA and Japan. The term of protection in Article 8 IPIC was constituted to at least eight years. The criticism is only partly acceptable. Indeed, the lifespan of some microchips
might last longer than eight years. But the majority of microchips are
far from being used longer than eight years. This is because of the fast
moving chip industry and the fast development of new layouts.
Nevertheless, the term of protection in Article 38 TRIPS Agreement
was extended to ten years. Here, the same formula is used as in patent
regulation.174 The earliest date on which the protection may begin is either “the date of filing an application for registration” or, “from the first
commercial exploitation wherever in the world it occurs.” Noticeably, in
contrast to Article 8 IPIC, the date of creation of the layout would not
be taken into account.
PART 4: AND THE FUTURE?
In 1985, Intel applied for a patent for the circuit design 27C256, a
programmable read-only chip with 256k memory. Other companies followed. Since the semiconductor protection has been included into
TRIPS, the topic “protection of chips” seems to have disappeared almost
entirely. There is hardly any publication on the protection of semiconductor technology, except for reviews in standard works, e.g. textbooks.
Furthermore, only a few decisions are known dealing with the sui generis regime. The Brooktree case175 became the only published U.S. case
on that matter where a jury ultimately issued a $26 million verdict
against a chip rights infringer which was upheld by a federal court of
appeals. Years later, the Ninth Circuit decided the case Altera v. Clear

173. Pamela Samuelson, Suzanne Scotchmer, The Law and Economics for Reverse
Engineering, 111 YALE L. J. 1575 (2001); Lee Hsu, Reverse Engineering Under the Semiconductor Chip Protection Act – Complications for Standard of Infringement, 5 ALB. L. J.
SCI. & TECH. 249 (1996); Harold R. Brown, Fear and Loathing of the Paper Trail: Originality in Products of Reverse Engineering Under the Semiconductor Chip Protection Act
as Analogized to the Fair Use of Nonfiction ,Literary Works, 41 SYRACUSE L. REV. 985
(1990); Richard H. Stern, Determining Liability for Infringement of Mask Work. Rights
Under the Semiconductor Chip Protection Act, 70 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW 271 (1985).
174. “[…] shall not end before the expiration of a period of […].” TRIPS , supra note
168 at Art. 33.
175. Brooktree Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 977 F.2d 155 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
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Logic.176 Clear Logic was sentenced to pay $30 million USD to Altera

for violating the SCPA.177 The argument of Clear Logic that they only
copied abstract features, not protectable mask work was dismissed finding that “groupings” shown in the mask were “physically a part of the
mask work” and were as such protectable.178 In the Nintendo Co. Ltd. v.
Centronics Systems Pty. Ltd. case, the Australian Court decided in
1991179 in favor of Nintendo and a Taiwanese chip producer. The judge
held that the visible differences of the layouts were insignificant design
changes and that no evaluation or analysis had been carried out by the
defendant.180
Apparently, the original interest in the protection on part of the
semiconductor industries has ceased. Already, some authors talk about
chip protection as a dead subject.181 Today the sui generis right is an example of the creation of special IP rights at the request of a limited
number of countries, which in the end is not used at all. Today the suigeneris rules for semiconductors are really “dead.”182 Industry is relying
on patents.183 This led to a strange patent paradox in the semiconductor
sector. In general, there are some voices in research which hint to the
mixed effects and the dysfunctional nature of patent protection in semiconductor R&D.184 In 1982, after the creation of a “pro-patent” Central
Appellate Court for the Federal Circuit (CAFC),185 the number of patents filed by semiconductor producers visibly increased. In an industry
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.

Altera Corp. v. Clear Logic, Inc., 424 F.3d 1079 (9th Cir. 2005)
Id. at 1081.
See also Avel Pty Limited v. Wells, FCA 590 (1991); 105 ALR 635 (1991).
(1991) FCA 791; (1992) AIPC 90-854; 23 IPR 119.

Id.
See Gunnar W. G. Karnell, Protection of Layout Designs (Topographies) of Integrated Circuits – R.I.P.?, IIC 648 (2001)(stating that the protection is “not only a ‘lame’
but rather “dead duck.”
182. See the former economist for the Semiconductor Industry Association Benz (n.1)
in an email to the author: “As an antitrust litigator, I have been disappointed that there
have not been more litigation to enforce mask work designs. The wave of SCPA litigation
we predicted never materialized.”
183. Bronwyn H. Hall & Rose Marie Ham Ziedonis, Patent Paradox Revisited: Determinants of Patenting in the US Semiconductor Industry, 1980-1994, NBER WORKING
PAPER NO. 7062 (1999)(hereinafter Hall & Ziedonis II). That has the consequence that the
courts are now dealing with the patent rights of semiconductor producers, for instance the
applicability of the first sale doctrine to chips see the US Supreme Court decision Quanta
Computer, Inc. v. LG Electronics., Inc., No. 06-937, 2008 U.S. LEXIS 4702 (U.S. June 9,
2008).
184. Edwin Mansfield et al., Imitation Costs and Patents: An Empirical study, 91
ECON J. 907 (1981); Benjamin N. Roin, The Case for Tailoring Patent Awards Based on
the Time-to-Market of Inventions, 61 UCLA L. REV. 36-37 (2014).
185. See the leading case on this issue, South Corp. v. United States, 690 F.2d 1368
(Fed. Cir. 1982).
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that previously has been among the least reliant on patents to protect
technological advantages, there was an upsurge in patents relative to
R&D expenditure after the 1980s.186
While companies relied more and more on patents, they were also
considered to be the most ineffective tools for protecting the knowledge
in that sector.187 This paradox seems to have been caused by the fear of
a race to the patent and existence of wider thicket of prior art in the silicon business.188 As a consequence, competitors in semiconductors came
back to the old times of the 1950s (see above) and the model of crosslicensing patent rights189 or covenants not to sue. These contracts are
linked with strong, extended trade secrets and confidentiality provisions.190 In this open cross-licensing system, the patent itself changes its
importance. It helps to avoid the risk of being sued for patent infringement; it is the source for the return on investment via licensing agreements. This defensive patent strategy is also helpful to guarantee internal incentives to the employees and to monitor the engineering
process. Furthermore, the IP system seems to have been the key to lubricating
the
orderly
development
of
the
semiconductor
gy.191 The publication of the patent applications especially alerted researchers to the work being already done by others and supported an
ecosystem where the inventors/researchers had respect for each other’s
work. The fact that cross licensing was and is the normal approach is a
great credit to the patent system - the balancing payments enabled
Hall & Ziedonis II, supra note 184 at 1-128.
Wesley Cohen et al., R & D Spillovers, Patents and the Incentives to Innovate in
Japan and the United States (2001), http://www.druid.dk/uploads/tx_picturedb/ds2001161.pdf [March 17, 2015]; Wesley Cohen, Richard R. Nelson & John P. Walsh, Protecting
186.
187.

Their Intellectual Assets: Appropriatability Conditions and Why U.S. Manufacturing
Firms Patent (or Not) (2000), http://www.nber.org/papers/w7552 [March 17, 2015].
188. Hall & Ziedonis I, supra note 121; R. P. Merges, R. R. Nelson, On the Complex
Economics of Patent Scope, 90 COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW 839 (1990).
189. Leon Radomsky, Sixteen Years after the Passage of the U.S. Semiconductor
Chip Protection Act: Is International Protection Working, 15 BERKELEY TECHNOLOGY L. J.
1049 (2000); T. G. Lewis, Comment: Semiconductor Chip Process Protection, 32 HOUSTON
LAW REVIEW 555, 605-06 (1995); Mehdi Ansari, LG Electronics, Inc. v. Bizcom Electronics,
Inc.: Solving the Foundry Problem in the Semiconductor Industry, 22 BERKELEY

TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL 137, 138 (2007) (who states that leading semiconductor manufacturers have used broad cross-licensing agreements to provide “patent peace and allow
development of parallel technology”); Dan Callaway, Note, Patent Incentives in the Semiconductor Industry, 4 HASTINGS BUSINESS LAW JOURNAL 135, 137 (2008) (“[L]arge semiconductor companies encourage their rivals to enter cross-licensing agreements.”).
190. See Terry Ludlow, Sign of the Times: Trends in Technology IP Licensing,
INTELLECTUAL ASSET MANAGEMENT, No. 66, 31-38, July-August 2014 describing that
trend as “mega-licensing.”
191. Special thanks to Roger J. Burt, former IBM patent attorney, for co-reading my
study and giving me some very valuable advice as the future of semiconductor industry
especially concerning the importance of the IP system in the semiconductor business.
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those doing the most research and invention to partly fund their efforts. As Roger Burt (former IBM patent attorney) stated, the “IP system, and the patent in particular, is the lubricant that enable the engine of research and development to run smoothly.”192
As to the sui-generis right, it is problematic that only the layoutdesign (topography) of microchips is the object of protection. For the industry, the function of an integrated circuit is more valuable to protect
than the design.193 Furthermore, layout-designs are easily variable
without loss of functionality. Topographies are therefore no longer protected once the design is altered (“reverse-engineering”). It is a condition of semiconductor protection that the layout-designs are based upon
intellectual effort.
In addition, microchips, i.e. their layout-designs, are highly complex, miniature entities which are rarely copied.194 This fact makes the
protection against forgers superfluous. Consequently, the protection of
semiconductor topography is uninteresting from an economic point of
view. Because of a fast developing technological sector, 195 microchips
have a short lifespan while the process getting to legal protection is rather time-consuming. Furthermore, it appears there is little point in
protecting semiconductor topography against the “danger” of reverseengineering. As previously mentioned, microchips with different topographies can accomplish the same function. Finally, the high costs of
producing microchips today including the necessity of manufacturer´s
support and the trend to tailor-made chip architecture makes chip piracy unaffordable. Topographies are also more and more influenced by
technical standards and norms which leave almost no place for variations of the layout. Today, the complexity semiconductor development
design cannot be controlled by a single country.196 With the new and
192. Roger Burt has been co-reading this paper; the wording above has been used in
an email to the author of February 25, 2015.
193. Gunnar W. G. Karnell, Protection of Layout Designs (Topographies) of Integrated Circuits – R.I.P.?, IIC 652 (2001).
194. Id.; Leon Radomsky, Sixteen Years after the Passage of the U.S. Semiconductor
Chip Protection Act: Is International Protection Working, 15 BERKELEY TECHNOLOGY L. J.
1049 (2000).
195. See Rahul Kapoor, Barney Silver & Eric Larson, Managing Complexity and
Change
in
the
Semiconductor
Ecosystem
5
(2012),
http://www.arenainternational.com/Journals/Company/4651/WhartonATREGIDMresearchreportNov.2012FINAL.pdf(‘‘
The average time-to-market, defined as the period from design art to mass production, is
about 11 months for a revision of an existing product design. It increases to about 17
months for a new product design.”)
196. See IKKA TUOMI, THE FUTURE OF SEMICONDUCTOR INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
ARCHITECTURAL BLOCKS IN EUROPE (2009).
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huge Chinese chip market, the times of the old fight between Japan and
the U.S. are definitely over. Future competition is not based on a single
technology but on a product variety combining pre-designed and pretested subcomponents. As a consequence, the increasing use of open
source models for such components is already discussed in literature. 197
The business infrastructure has changed as well. The integrated
designing and manufacturing of chips was the old business model. Today, the fabless companies have won the game, companies which are
only designing chips especially for specialized purposes. The moneyconsuming production of these chips is organized via a few big plants
(“foundries” like TSMC or Globalfoundries).198 The so-called netlists given by the fabless chip designing companies to the foundries are protected by copyright law (i.e. as text, software, or database) insofar as they
include highly valuable and creative text-format converted chip designs.199
Astonishingly, an economic analysis of the factors which caused the
death of the SCPA sui generis right has never been made. The situation
is similar to other new rights which were installed to the high lobbyist
pressure of industry.200 For instance, the Commission only evaluated the
sui generis right for the production of databases. 201 When the results
were published showing that the new sui generis right had no effect on
the database industry at all, the EU Commission remained silent. New
rights were often invented in IP law, but nobody dares to abolish them
again. The beginning of the semiconductor industry showed that sometimes regulatory interventions are perhaps not too necessary to promote
innovation and that nations should respect the self-regulatory forces
within the business sector using cross-licensing or codes of conduct in197. Eli Greenbaum, Open Source Semiconductor Core Licensing, 25 HARVARD
JOURNAL OF LAW & TECHNOLOGY 131-57 (2011).
198. See figures on IC Insights, Top 13 Foundries Account for 91 % of Total Foundry
Sales in 2013 (2014), http://www.icinsights.com/news/bulletins/Top-13-Foundries-AccountFor-91-Of-Total-Foundry-Sales-In-2013/ [March 17, 2015].
199. They can as well be protected via encryption and watermarking. See Moritz
Schmid, Daniel Ziener & Jürgen Teich, Netlist-Level IP Protection by Watermarking for
LUT-Based FPGAs, http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/summary?doi=10.1.1.161.3876,
(last visited March 17, 2015).
200. The SCPA was the starting point of similar sui generis regulations in the United States. For instance, there is clear evidence that it is the model behind the Vessel
Hulls Protection Design Act.
It is thus amazing that the most recent article on the semiconductor protection (after a
long silence of 30 years) held that the US Act might be a model for regulating the protection of stem cells; see Simone A. Rose, Semiconductor Chips, Genes and Stem Cells: New
Wine for New Bottles?, 38 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF LAW & MEDICINE 113-57 (2012).
201. Commission of the European Communities, supra note 162.
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stead of new sui generis rights.
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